Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and Datagram TLS (DTLS).
Introduction
Over the last few years there have been several major attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] , including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. Details are given in Section 2, but a quick summary is that both AES-CBC and RC4, which together make up for most current usage, have been seriously attacked in the context of TLS. [Page 2]
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This situation was one of the motivations for the creation of the UTA working group, which was tasked with the creation of generic and protocol-specific recommendations for the use of TLS along with Datagram TLS (DTLS) [RFC6347] (unless otherwise noted under Section 3, all of the information provided in this document applies to DTLS).
"Attacks always get better; they never get worse" (ironically, this saying is attributed to the U.S. National Security Agency, the NSA). This attacks summarized in this document reflect our knowledge as of this writing. It seems likely that new attacks will be discovered in the future.
For a more detailed discussion of the attacks listed here, the interested reader is referred to [Attacks-iSec].
Attacks on TLS
This section lists the attacks that motivated the current recommendations in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] . This list is not intended to be an extensive survey of the security of TLS.
While there are widely deployed mitigations for some of the attacks listed below, we believe that their root causes necessitate a more systematic solution, which we have attempted to develop in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
When an identifier exists for an attack, we have included its CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) ID. CVE [CVE] is an extensive, industry-wide database of software vulnerabilities.
SSL Stripping
Various attacks attempt to remove the use of SSL/TLS altogether, by modifying unencrypted protocols that request the use of TLS, specifically modifying HTTP traffic and HTML pages as they pass on the wire. These attacks are known collectively as SSL Stripping (a form of the more generic "downgrade attack") and were first introduced by Moxie Marlinspike [SSL-Stripping] 2.3. BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) The BEAST attack [BEAST] uses issues with the TLS 1.0 implementation of CBC (that is, the predictable initialization vector) to decrypt parts of a packet, and specifically to decrypt HTTP cookies when HTTP is run over TLS.
Padding Oracle Attacks
A consequence of the MAC-then-encrypt design in all current versions of TLS is the existence of padding oracle attacks [Padding-Oracle] . A recent incarnation of these attacks is the Lucky Thirteen attack (CVE-2013-0169) [CBC-Attack], a timing side-channel attack that allows the attacker to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext.
The Lucky Thirteen attack can be mitigated by using authenticated encryption like AES-GCM [RFC5288] or encrypt-then-mac [I-D.ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac] instead of the TLS default of MACthen-encrypt.
An even newer variant of the padding oracle attack, one that does not use timing information, is the POODLE attack (CVE-2014-3566) [POODLE] on SSL 3.0. This attack has no known mitigation.
Attacks on RC4
The RC4 algorithm [RC4] 2.6. Compression Attacks: CRIME, TIME and BREACH The CRIME attack [CRIME] (CVE-2012-4929) allows an active attacker to decrypt ciphertext (specifically, cookies) when TLS is used with TLS level compression.
The TIME attack [TIME] and the later BREACH attack [BREACH] (CVE-2013-3587 , though the number has not been officially allocated) both make similar use of HTTP-level compression to decrypt secret data passed in the HTTP response. We note that compression of the HTTP message body is much more prevalent than compression at the TLS level.
The former attack can be mitigated by disabling TLS compression. We are not aware of mitigations at the TLS protocol level to the latter attack, and so application-level mitigations are needed (see [BREACH] ). For example, implementations of HTTP that use CSRF tokens will need to randomize them. Even the best practices and recommendations from [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are insufficient to thwart this attack.
Certificate and RSA-Related Attacks
There have been several practical attacks on TLS when used with RSA certificates (the most common use case). These include [Bleichenbacher98] and [Klima03] . While the Bleichenbacher attack has been mitigated in TLS 1.0, the Klima attack relies on a versioncheck oracle is only mitigated by TLS 1.1. In addition, clients that do not properly verify the received parameters are exposed to man in the middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately the TLS protocol does not mandate this verification (see [RFC6989] for analogous information for IPsec).
2.10. Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) A major attack on the TLS renegotiation mechanism applies to all current versions of the protocol. The attack and the TLS extension that resolves it are described in [RFC5746] .
2.11. Triple Handshake (CVE-2014 (CVE- -1295 The triple handshake attack [BhargavanDFPS14] [Delignat14] describes a security issue whereby SSLv3 fallback and improper handling of session caches on the server side can be abused by an attacker to establish a malicious connection to a virtual host other than the one originally intended and approved by the server. This attack is especially serious in performance critical environments where sharing of SSLv3 session caches is very common.
Denial of Service
Server CPU power has progressed over the years so that TLS can now be turned on by default. However, the risk of malicious clients and coordinated groups of clients ("botnets") mounting denial of service attacks is still very real. TLS adds another vector for computational attacks, since a client can easily (with little computational effort) force the server to expend relatively large computational work. It is known that such attacks have in fact been mounted.
Implementation Issues
Even when the protocol is properly specified, this does not guarantee the security of implementations. In fact there are very common issues that often plague TLS implementations. In particular, when integrating into higher-level protocols, TLS and its PKI-based authentication are sometimes the source of misunderstandings and implementation "shortcuts". An extensive survey of these issues can be found in [Georgiev2012] .
o Implementations might omit validation of the server certificate altogether. For example, this is true of the default implementation of HTTP client libraries in Python 2 (see e.g. CVE-2013 CVE- -2191 .
o Implementations might not validate the server identity. This validation typically amounts to matching the protocol-level server name with the certificate's Subject Alternative Name field. Note: this same information is often also found in the Common Name part of the Distinguished Name, and some validators incorrectly retrieve it from there instead of from the Subject Alternative Name.
o Implementations might validate the certificate chain incorrectly or not at all, or use an incorrect or outdated trust anchor list. Sheffer, et al. Expires April 26, 2015 [Page 7] Internet-Draft
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An implementation attack of a different kind, one that exploits a simple coding mistake (bounds check), is the Heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160 ) that affected a wide swath of the Internet when it was discovered in April 2014.
Usability
Many TLS endpoints, such as browsers and mail clients, allow the user to explicitly accept an invalid server certificate. This often takes the form of a UI dialog (e.g., "do you accept this server?") and users have been conditioned to respond in the affirmative in order to allow the connection to take place.
This user behavior is used by (arguably legitimate) "SSL proxies" that decrypt and re-encrypt the TLS connection in order to enforce local security policy. It is also abused by attackers whose goal is to gain access to the encrypted information.
Mitigation is complex and will probably involve a combination of protocol mechanisms (HSTS, certificate pinning [I-D.ietf-websec-key-pinning]) and very careful UI design.
Applicability to DTLS DTLS [RFC4347] [RFC6347] is an adaptation of TLS for UDP.
With respect to the attacks described in the current document, DTLS 1.0 is equivalent to TLS 1.1. The only exception is RC4, which is disallowed in DTLS. DTLS 1.2 is equivalent to TLS 1.2. 
